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Interpreting Commercial Speech Under the
Lanham Act's Commercial Use Requirement:
Tension Between Online Trademark and
First Amendment Free Speech Rights
R. Kent Warren*
INTRODUCTION
Federal trademark protection statutes grant trademark
owners the exclusive right to use specific words; thus, trademark
protection laws have the inherent potential to infringe on First
Amendment free speech rights.' This is especially true when
trademark laws are broadly interpreted, limiting more speech than•2
Congress intended. In the context of trademark infringement
Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law,
2007.
1. The First Amendment of the Constitution states: "Congress shall
make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech...." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Thus, granting trademark owners the exclusive right to use certain words
could potentially limit the First Amendment right to free speech. See
generally Yankee Publ'g, Inc. v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 275-
76 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("The grant to one person of the exclusive right to use a
set of words or symbols in trade can collide with the free speech rights of
others.").
2. See generally Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 313 (4th Cir. 2005).
In Lamparello, the court stated:
Trademark law serves the important functions of
protecting product identification [but] protections
against unfair competition cannot be transformed into
rights to control language. Such a transformation
would raise serious First Amendment concerns
because it would limit the ability to discuss the
products or criticize the conduct of companies that
may be of widespread public concern and importance.
Much useful social and commercial discourse would be
all but impossible if speakers were under threat of an
infringement lawsuit every time they made reference
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claims based on Internet domain names, courts have inconsistently
applied federal trademark law under the Trademark Act of 1946
("Lanham Act"),3 especially when analyzing the Act's commercial•4
use requirement. Under the Lanham Act, trademark infringement
exists only when the use of the trademark is both commercial and
misleading. The Lanham Act does not prohibit the noncommercial
use of another trademark owner's mark6 because noncommercial
speech receives greater First Amendment protection than
commercial speech.' Therefore, under the commercial use
requirement, accurate classification of speech as either commercial
or noncommercial is critical. While some courts, like the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, have broadly interpreted commercial
to a person, company or product by using its
trademark.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000) (granting a trademark owner the exclusive
right to use the registered mark, the authority to enjoin the unauthorized use
of the mark, and the ability to recover damages for unauthorized use).
4. The Lanham Act's commercial use requirement states that the
infringing party's use must be "in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services .... ." 15 U.S.C. §
1114(1)(a). Courts have been inconsistent in construing the Act's commercial
use requirement. Compare PETA v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001),
and discussion infra Part II.A.2 with Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403
F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2005), and discussion infra Part III.A.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (stating that the use must be "in connection
with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake, or to deceive").
6. See generally Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 775 (6th Cir.
2003) (noting that "any expression embodying the use of a mark not 'in
connection with the sale ... or advertising of any goods or services,' and not
likely to cause confusion, is outside the jurisdiction of the Lanham Act and
necessarily protected by the First Amendment").
7. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980) (stating that the "Constitution ... accords a lesser
protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed
expression"); see also Kremer, 403 F.3d at 677 ("As a matter of First
Amendment law, commercial speech may be regulated in ways that would be
impermissible if the same regulation were applied to noncommercial
expressions."); Taubman, 319 F.3d at 774 (stating that commercial speech "is
entitled to reduced protections under the First Amendment").
344 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol.4
speech, other courts, such as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
have interpreted commercial speech more narrowly. To alleviate
this confusion and strike a better balance between online
trademark protection and First Amendment free speech rights,
courts should adopt a uniform "commercial use test" under the
Lanham Act.
This Note examines whether the current analysis used to
classify Internet domain names as either commercial or
noncommercial speech under the Lanham Act's commercial use
requirement is sufficient to protect First Amendment free speech
rights. This Note contends that when courts broadly interpret what
constitutes commercial speech, they misconstrue the Lanham Act's
commercial use requirement, permit federal trademark law to limit
more speech than Congress intended, and infringe on First
Amendment free speech rights. Thus, when determining whether
the use of a trademark owner's mark in a domain name is
considered commercial speech, courts should focus on whether the
infringing party is directly involved in commercial transactions in an
attempt to profit from the trademark owner's goodwill.
Part I explains the purpose of trademark protection law and
how its limited speech restrictions benefit both businesses and
consumers. In addition, Part I illustrates the differences between a
trademark infringement claim brought under the Lanham Act and
a claim brought under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act ("ACPA").' ° Part II examines two cases, Jews for Jesus v.
1 12Brodsky' and PETA v. Doughney, in which both courts
interpreted commercial speech broadly. The Brodsky court found
the defendant's website to be misleading and deceptive, and based
8. Compare PETA, 263 F.3d at 365 with Kremer, 403 F.3d at 679.
9. Throughout this Note, the term "goodwill" is defined as "the favor or
advantage that a business has acquired esp. through its brands and its good
reputation." MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 539 (11th ed.
2004).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000) (prohibiting the registration of trademarks
as Internet domain names when done so with the bad-faith intent to profit
from the trademark owner's goodwill).
11. 993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998).
12. 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001).
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upon those findings and other factors, held that the website
constituted commercial use in violation of the Lanham Act. 3 In
PETA, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the
defendant-appellant's website inhibited Internet users from locating
the trademark owner's official website.14 Thus, the court found that
the website constituted commercial speech, even though the site did
not sell or advertise goods or services. 15 These courts subjected
seemingly noncommercial speech to trademark infringement
restrictions, thereby infringing upon online First Amendment free
speech rights. Part II also contrasts the Brodsky and PETA
decisions with Taubman Co. v. Webfeats,16 a Sixth Circuit case in
which the court interpreted commercial speech more narrowly in
favor of greater First Amendment protection.
17
To determine how courts currently interpret the Lanham
Act's commercial use requirement, Part III discusses two recent
federal circuit court cases, Bosley Medical Institute, Inc. v. Kremer"'
and Lamparello v. Falwell.'9 In Kremer, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals narrowly interpreted commercial speech. In its
commercial use analysis, the court primarily focused on whether or
not the alleged infringing party used its website to offer competing
goods and services but did not consider the effect such use had on
the trademark owner. ° In Kremer, the Ninth Circuit at least
attempted to determine what constitutes commercial speech under
the Lanham Act. However, in Lamparello, the Fourth Circuit
based its decision on the Lanham Act's "likelihood of confusion"
S21
requirement.
The current inconsistency in the Fourth Circuit regarding
what constitutes commercial speech under the Lanham Act's
commercial use requirement confuses federal trademark
13. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. at 307-08.
14. PETA, 263 F.3d at 365.
15. Id. at 366.
16. 319 F.3d 770 (6th Cir. 2003).
17. Id. at 775.
18. 403 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2005).
19. 420 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2005).
20. Kremer, 403 F.3d at 679.
21. Lamparello, 420 F.3d at 314.
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jurisprudence. Part IV of this Note proposes that the United States
Supreme Court or the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals should
adopt a uniform commercial use determination test under the
Lanham Act. Under this proposed alternative test, a narrow
definition of commercial speech should be used. That is, in order
for speech to be commercial, the alleged infringing party's website
must be directly involved in commercial transactions in an attempt
to profit from the trademark owner's goodwill. Under the
alternative test, trademark law would prevent the unauthorized use
of trademarks and thus, would protect the exclusive rights of
trademark owners. At the same time, this test would permit
individuals to use registered trademarks for noncommercial critical
commentary and parody and as a result, would protect First
Amendment free speech rights. This alternative test would strike a
better balance between federal trademark rights and First
Amendment free speech rights.
I. TRADEMARK PROTECTION LAW
A. The Purpose of Trademark Protection Law
Within its proper scope, trademark protection is
advantageous to both businesses and consumers. For example,
businesses are encouraged to spend more money to produce higher
quality goods and to provide better services because they are• ., 22
protected from unlawful imitation. Because imitators are not
permitted to use a protected trademark23 like a company name,
24logo, or slogan, businesses and their trademarks can develop
22. For instance, Ford Motors Company will spend the money required
to manufacture high quality vehicles because the company realizes it is
protected from competitors using the Ford name in an attempt to profit from
Ford's goodwill.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (2000) (granting the trademark owner the "exclusive
right" to use its mark).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2000) (providing protection for almost all
distinguishable trademarks except for disparaging or deceptive marks and
marks comprising the flag of the United States).
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extremely profitable reputations. In addition, consumers benefit
from trademark protection because it aids in preventing them from
purchasing inferior imitation products bearing another's trademark.
Furthermore, consumers recognize trademarks and are able to
readily distinguish between competing goods and services, thereby
reducing consumer search costs. 26 While trademark protection laws
benefit businesses and consumers, restrictions on language can
potentially limit First Amendment free speech rights.27
B. The Lanham Act
Until Congress enacted the Lanham Act in 1946, state
courts used the common law to protect trademarks. 28 The Lanham
Act protects trademarks by prohibiting other commercial use of the
mark that creates a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the
25. To illustrate, XYZ company has an excellent reputation for its high
quality audio products. Consumers understand that if they purchase an XYZ
product, they are investing wisely in the best quality available on the market.
Because XYZ has such a strong reputation, consumers may even be willing to
pay a higher price for an item bearing its name than for the same item made
by another manufacturer. Thus, the reputation that XYZ has built for itself is
extremely profitable to the company.
26. For example, a consumer would have little trouble locating a Coca-
Cola product in a grocery store because the Coca-Cola mark is well-known
and recognizable. However, if a manufacturer other than Coca-Cola used the
Coca-Cola mark on its product as well, then both Coca-Cola products and the
other manufacturer's product would bear the same mark. Thus, it would be
more difficult for the consumer to locate the authentic Coca-Cola product. A
consumer might even have to test each product in order to determine which is
authentic.
27. See Yankee Publ'g, Inc. v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267,
275-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that granting a trademark owner the exclusive
right to use its mark can potentially infringe on the First Amendment free
speech rights of others).
28. See generally Park 'n Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189,
193 (1985) ("Congress enacted the Lanham Act in 1946 in order to provide
national protection for trademarks used in interstate and foreign commerce.
Previous federal legislation . . . reflected the view that protection of
trademarks was a matter of state concern and that the right to a mark
depended solely on the common law.") (citations omitted).
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mark.29 The Lanham Act defines commercial use as "in connection
with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any
goods or services . . . .,30 Under this Act, nearly every distinctive
word, phrase, logo, or symbol used to identify goods and services is
eligible for federal trademark protection. ' Trademark registration
grants a trademark owner the exclusive rights to use the mark,32 the
authority to enjoin others from using it,33 and the ability to recover
damages for its wrongful use. 34 The Lanham Act limits free speech
rights; however, it is constitutional because it only limits
commercial speech.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). The Act provides that without the consent of
the trademark owner persons are forbidden to "reproduce, counterfeit, copy
or colorably imitate a registered mark ... in connection with the sale, offering
for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services [if] such use is likely
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive." 15 U.S.C. §
1114(1)(a); see also Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 775 (6th Cir.
2003) ("[Als per the language of the Lanham Act, any expression embodying
the use of a mark not 'in connection with the sale ... or advertising of any
goods or services,' and not likely to cause confusion, is outside the jurisdiction
of the Lanham Act and necessarily protected by the First Amendment.").
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a); see also Taubman, 319 F.3d at 776 (stating
that commercial speech under the Lanham Act means "in connection with the
sale ... or advertising of any goods or services").
31. 15 U.S.C § 1052 (stating that "[n]o trademark by which the goods of
the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused
registration ... unless it" contains immoral material, consists of the flag of the
United States, consists of a name, portrait, or signature of a living person
without consent, resembles another registered mark, or is not distinctive).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1115.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (2000).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2000).
35. See Taubman, 319 F.3d at 774 (stating that the Lanham Act is
constitutional as "it only regulates commercial speech, which is entitled to
reduced protections under the First Amendment").
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C. The Lanham Act Amendments
1. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("FFDA")
In 1996, Congress enacted the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act ("F[DA")36 to "expand[] the scope of federal trademark law."37
The FTDA grants a trademark owner the authority to seek an
injunction against "another person's commercial use in commerce
of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has
become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the
mark . . ,38 The FTDA's "commercial use in commerce"
requirement has been interpreted to be "roughly analogous to the
[commercial use] requirement" of the Lanham Act.39 As a result,
when performing a commercial use analysis, courts typically
analyze Lanham Act trademark infringement claims and FFDA
claims together.40
2. The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA")
In 1999, Congress further amended the Lanham Act to
include the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
("ACPA")4' in order to "protect consumers and American
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(2000).
37. Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 676 (9th Cir. 2005).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
39. Kremer, 403 F.3d at 676 (citing Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc.,
296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002)). In Mattel, the court noted that "[a]lthough
this statutory language is ungainly, its meaning seems clear: It refers to a use
of a famous and distinctive mark to sell goods other than those produced or
authorized by the mark's owner." Mattel, 296 F.3d at 903.
40. See generally Kremer, 403 F.3d at 676 (noting the similarities between
the FTDA's "commercial use in commerce" requirement and the Lanham
Act's "commercial use" requirement and stating that in its commercial use
analysis, a court generally analyzes FTDA and Lanham Act claims together).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). The ACPA and the Lanham Act provide
trademark owners with separate causes of action. The ACPA applies only to
specific types of online trademark infringement. However, a trademark owner
349
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businesses, to promote the growth of online commerce, and to
provide clarity in the law for trademark owners by prohibiting the
bad-faith and abusive registration of distinctive marks as Internet
domain names with the intent to profit from the goodwill associated
with such marks .... ,,2 Congress sought to eradicate "the practice
of cybersquatters registering several hundred domain names in an
effort to sell them to the legitimate owners of the mark.,
43
D. The Practice of Cybersquatting and its Variations
Domain names provide Internet users with labels that are
easy to identify and helpful in locating particular web pages.44
Domain names consist of a host and a domain. 4 To illustrate, in the
that suspects the unauthorized use of its mark on the Internet may still bring a
traditional trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act.
42. S. REP. No. 106-140, at 4 (1999).
43. Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse, 359 F.3d 806, 810 (6th
Cir. 2004). In Lucas Nursery, the defendant-appellee registered the domain
name "lucasnursery.com" to criticize Lucas Nursery, the landscaping company
the plaintiff-appellant hired to landscape her yard. Id. at 808. Lucas Nursery
filed a complaint under the ACPA, but the court held that the defendant-
appellee's critical commentary website did not violate the ACPA. Id. at 811.
44. See generally Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Network
Solutions, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 1276, 1277 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 1997). Domain names,
used to locate web pages on the Internet, are more user-friendly than IP
numbers. Id. The court explained:
Domain names are used to locate information on the
Internet. Each computer or network linked to the
Internet has a unique numerical address called an
Internet Protocol number ("IP number"). An IP
number is four groups of digits separated by decimal
points, for example, "013.917.114.41." These IP
numbers are converted into a more user-friendly, letter
based format called a "domain name" by specialized
computers called "domain name servers."
Id.
45. See generally Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 983 F.
Supp. 1331, 1335 (D. Or. 1997). The court explained that the host "refers to a
computer or device that is attached to the Internet," and the domain refers to
the Internet divisions including ".org," ".gov," ".edu," ".com," and ".net." Id.
2006] LANHAM ACT'S COMMERCIAL USE 351
case of the domain name, "HypotheticalDomainName.com,"
"HypotheticalDomainName" is the host and ".com" is the
domain.46 Frequently, a trademark owner's domain name consists
of its trademark name followed by a top level domain, such as
".com," ".net," or ".org. 47 For example, the domain name for Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. is "walmart.com. ' 4 A business organization like
Wal-Mart recognizes that the easier it is for consumers to locate
and remember its website, the more likely they will return to the
site.49 As the importance and popularity of the Internet has grown,
the potential for online profit has also expanded. 0 As a result,
certain domain names, specifically those containing a registered
trademark, have increased in value.'
Recognizing the enormous disconnect between cost and
value, many entrepreneurial Internet users began registering
46. See generally id. ("In the case of 'epix.com,' the host is 'epix' and the
domain is 'com."').
47. See generally id. The ".org" domain is for non-profit organizations,
".gov" is for government agencies, ".edu" is for educational institutions, and
".net" is for communication entities. In the case of ".com," the domain is for
commercial businesses. Id.
48. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Home Page, http://www.walmart.com.
49. One source describes important considerations when choosing a
domain name and notes that most people will type a site's Internet address,
also known as a Uniform Resource Locator or URL, directly into their web
browser. Tips on How to Choose a Good Domain Name, http://a-web-
biz.com/domain.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2006). The source also reports that
in 2001, 52% of all websites received their visitors after those individuals typed
the domain names directly into their web browser. Id.
50. In fact, a report released by the Government Finance Officers
Association indicated that "retailers with both physical and Internet stores []
saw a 60% increase in Internet sales in 2002," and expected an additional 20%
increase over the next five years. GOVERNMENT FINANCE OFFICERS
ASSOCIATION, TAXATION OF REMOTE SALES 1 (2005), available at http://www.
gfoa.org/flc/documents/SSTP0605.pdf.
51. See generally Cybersquatters: Invading Big Names' Domains,
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/09/06/internet.domains (last
visited Mar. 14, 2006) (detailing examples of domain names that have sold for
millions of dollars).
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hundreds of domain names containing popular trademarks52 in a
process known as cybersquatting." After registering the domain
names, cybersquatters will try to sell these domain names to the
corresponding trademark owner for exorbitant prices.5 For
example, if an individual had registered "walmart.com" before Wal-55
Mart had the opportunity to do so, the individual would have
owned that domain name for the registration price of about thirty
dollars. 6 If Wal-Mart had failed to register "walmart.com" first, it
might have cost the company thousands or even millions of dollars
to obtain that domain name from the cybersquatter 
5 7
Other popular variations of cybersquatting include
typosquatting, cybergriping, and metataging.
1. Typosquatting
Typosquatting involves "registering domain names that are
intentional misspellings of distinctive or famous names., 8  To
52. See generally Cybersquatting and Consumer Protection: Ensuring
Domain Name Integrity (Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy, Ranking
Member, Senate Judiciary Committee), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/
press/199907/990722.html. Senator Leahy reported that Dennis Toeppen, a
cybersquatter from Illinois, registered over a hundred domain names
containing protected trademarks, including "neiman-marcus.com" and
"deltaairlines.com." Id.
53. See generally Morrison & Foerster v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1127
(D. Colo. 2000) (describing the practice of cybersquatting).
54. See generally id. ("Trademark owners are frequently willing to pay
'ransom' in order to protect their marks.").
55. Most domain name registrars do not inquire "whether a domain
name request matches or conflicts with another's trademark." Id.
56. See Tips on How to Choose a Good Domain Name, supra note 49
(reporting that "[elven with the most expensive registrar you will not pay
more than $30 to own [a] domain name for [a] whole year").
57. See generally Cybersquatters: Invading Big Names' Domains, supra
note 51 (noting the increasing value of domain names generally and reporting
that the owner of travel.com claims to have received offers of more than $100
million for the purchase of that domain name).
58. See generally Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 2001)
(stating that the defendant-appellant "admits that he registers domain names
... because they are likely misspellings of famous marks or personal names").
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illustrate, if an individual were to register the domain name
"dismey.com," an intentional misspelling of the Walt Disney
Company's website "disney.com, 5 9 then that individual would be
typosquatting. Thus, if an individual searching for Disney's official
site accidentally mistypes or misspells "disney.com," then that
individual could be directed to the typosquatter's website instead.6
Once at the typosquatter's website, the Internet user would
probably be "unable to exit without clicking on a succession of
advertisements., 6' Thus, the typosquatter profits from the goodwill
of Disney's trademark. Additionally, a typosquatter often uses its61
website to criticize the trademark owner, so the typosquatter's
website "dismey.com" could be used for profit and as a web page
devoted to criticizing the Walt Disney Company.
2. Cybergriping
Cybergriping involves registering domain names using a
protected trademark followed by the word "sucks." While
cybergriping may be used for profit, cybergrippers primarily use
63their websites to criticize trademark owners. Registration of the
domain name "Walmartsucks.com" would be an example of
cybergriping. Thus, an individual that had a bad shopping
experience at a Wal-Mart store might register the domain name
"walmartsucks.com" and use the website to criticize product quality
or employee competence.
59. See Walt Disney Company Home Page, http://www.disney.com.
60. See generally Shields, 254 F.3d at 483.
61. Id. at 480.
62. See, e.g., Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 311-12 (4th Cir. 2005).
Lamparello created "fallwell.com" to attract Falwell's online audience who
would be searching for "falwell.com." Id. at 311. Lamparello used his website
to criticize the Reverend Falwell's views on homosexuality and Christianity.
Id. However, unlike many typosquatters, Lamparello did not attempt to profit
from his website. Id.
63. See generally Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 772 (6th Cir.
2003). In Taubman, the defendant-appellant created "taubmansucks.com" to
criticize the trademark owner, The Taubman Company. Id. at 772.
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3. Metataging
Metataging involves the frequent unauthorized use of a
trademark on a website to affect online search engine results.64 For
example, Dean's Lingerie, a hypothetical company's new line of
lingerie, plans to directly compete with the lingerie superstore
Victoria's Secret. Therefore, Dean's Lingerie, found at
"deanslingerie.com," designs its web page so that the phrase
"Victoria's Secret" is mentioned thousands of times within the
Dean's Lingerie website. Thus, when an Internet user conducts an
online search for "Victoria's Secret" using an online search engine
such as Google65 or Yahoo!,66 the search engine will find Dean's
Lingerie's website. Depending on the number of times the Dean's
Lingerie site mentions "Victoria's Secret," it may even be listed
ahead of the Victoria's Secret site in the search results. Through
metataging, Dean's Lingerie could benefit from the goodwill of
Victoria's Secret with minimal effort.
With the advent of cybersquatting and its subsequent
variations, courts are presented with an entirely new generation of
trademark infringement issues. With little precedent, courts must
decide how much protection to afford trademark owners in this
context, and as a result, courts will be directly affecting online free
speech rights.
D. Comparing the Lanham Act and the ACPA
Although the ACPA was enacted to address trademark
infringement relating to abusive domain name registration, 67
64. See generally J.K. Harris & Co. v. Kassel, 253 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1122-
23 (N.D. Cal. 2003). In this case, the defendant, a direct competitor of the
plaintiff, mentioned the plaintiff's name many times throughout its website, so
when an Internet user ran an online search for the plaintiff's site, the
defendant's website was also listed in the search results. Id.
65. See Google Home Page, http://www/google.com.
66. See Yahoo! Home Page, http://www.yahoo.com.
67. S. REP. No. 106-140, at 4 (1999) (stating that one purpose of the
ACPA is "to provide clarity in the law for trademark owners by prohibiting
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trademark owners frequently bring Lanham Act trademark
infringement claims, in addition to or in place of ACPA claims,
against individuals who purchase allegedly infringing domain
names. 8 In cases where both Lanham Act and ACPA claims exist,
courts address the claims separately due to their different
requirements.69
A Lanham Act violation requires the infringing use to be
commercial, which the Act defines as "in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or
services," and the use must cause a likelihood of confusion with the
original mark.70  However, an ACPA violation requires the
infringing use to be "confusingly similar" to the original trademark
and done with a "bad faith intent to profit.,
71
Though Lanham Act and ACPA violations have different
requirements, evidence exists to suggest that when addressing
trademark infringement claims of Internet domain names, these
separate violations have some things in common. For example, like
the Lanham Act, Congress enacted the ACPA "to provide clarity in
the law for trademark owners" in dealing with the abusive
registration of Internet domain names•.7  Furthermore, although a
Lanham Act violation does not require a bad faith intent to profit,
the Ninth Circuit recently noted that applying "the Lanham Act to
cases where a defendant is trying to profit from a plaintiff's
trademark is consistent with [the United States] Supreme Court's
view" of the proper function of trademark law.73 Therefore, in
the bad-faith . . . registration of . . . [trademarks] as Internet domain names
with the intent to profit from the goodwill associated with [the] [trademark]").
68. See, e.g., Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2005); PETA v.
Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001).
69. See, e.g., Lamparello, 420 F.3d at 318 (evaluating the "cybersquatting
claim separately because the elements of a cybersquatting violation differ
from those of traditional Lanham Act violations"); Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v.
Kremer, 403 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2005) (treating the cybersquatting and
trademark infringement claims separately).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A).
72. S. REP. No. 106-140, at 4 (1999).
73. Kremer, 403 F.3d at 679 (quoting United Drug Co. v. Theodore
Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918)).
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creating a workable Lanham Act commercial use test for
infringement of Internet domain names, the ACPA's bad faith
intent to profit requirement might offer helpful insight.
II. WHAT CONSTITUTES COMMERCIAL SPEECH UNDER THE
LANHAM ACT'S COMMERCIAL USE REQUIREMENT
In analyzing online trademark infringement claims under
the Lanham Act, a court's classification of speech as either
commercial or noncommercial directly affects First Amendment
free speech rights. For instance, the courts in Jews for Jesus v.
Brodsky4 and PETA v. Doughney75 construed commercial speech
broadly, limiting online First Amendment free speech rights. On
76the other hand, in Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, the court construed
commercial speech more narrowly, providing greater protection to
free speech rights."
A. Broad Interpretations of Commercial Speech
1. Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky
78
In Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, the United States District
Court of New Jersey liberally defined commercial speech in
determining whether the defendant's use of the plaintiff's
trademark violated the Lanham Act.9 In Brodsky, the Jews for
Jesus organization filed a Lanham Act trademark infringement suit
74. 993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998).
75. 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001).
76. 319 F.3d 770 (6th Cir. 2003).
77. Id. at 778.
78. 993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998). This case was decided prior to the
enactment of the ACPA in 1999.
79. Id. at 308 (stating that the defendant's use of the plaintiff's trademark
in the defendant's domain name was commercial speech, even though "the
Defendant['s] Internet site does not solicit funds" and is not for profit).
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against Brodsky80 for registering "jewsforjesus.org," a website
Brodsky used to criticize Jews for Jesus and to offer an opposing• • 81
viewpoint. Brodsky claimed his use was not trademark
infringement because his domain name and website constituted
noncommercial speech.8 He also claimed the First Amendment
81protected his website's critical commentary. While the court
agreed with Brodsky that the "exception for non-commercial use of
a famous mark is intended to prevent courts from enjoining
constitutionally protected speech,"" the court ultimately held that
Brodsky "ha[d] done more than merely register a domain name.
He ha[d] created . . . a 'bogus Jews for Jesus site' intended to
intercept, through the use of deceit and trickery, the audience
sought by [Jews for Jesus]." ' The court granted Jews for Jesus a
preliminary injunction against Brodsky for use of the website, 86 and
80. Id. at 287. The plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin
Brodsky from:
(1) diluting the federally-registered service mark,
"Jews f[star]r Jesus" [sic] and the common law service
mark, "Jews for Jesus" (2) infringing the registered
mark of the Plaintiff Organization, (3) unfairly
competing and falsely designating, describing and
representing the origin of the Internet Web sites
maintained by the Defendant, (4) diluting the
Plaintiff's mark pursuant to state statutory law, (5)
infringing Plaintiff's rights in its name and registered
mark in violation of state statutory law and (6) unfairly
competing in violation of common law.
Id. at 287.
81. Id. at 290-91. The defendant stated that he thought he "could
provide an educational counterpoint against [the plaintiff's] lies." Id.
82. Id. at 307. Instead, Brodsky claimed that "his speech [was] non-
commercial because 'it [was] meant to call attention to issues of public
importance."' Id.
83. Id. at 290.
84. Id. at 307.
85. Id. at 308.
86. Id. at 313. The court noted:
Injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy which
should be granted only if [Jews for Jesus] produces
evidence sufficient to demonstrate the following four
factors: (1) the likelihood that the Plaintiff
358 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol.4
the opinion was later affirmed by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals without published opinion."7
In response to Brodsky, the question then arises whether or
not the intention to capture a trademark owner's online audience
constitutes commercial use under the Lanham Act. Brodsky was• 88
not attempting to profit from the Jews for Jesus audience; he wasS 89
only using the website to criticize the organization. His actions are
analogous to those of an individual protesting outside the Jews for
Jesus headquarters. It is unlikely that a court would find that this
individual's protesting constitutes commercial speech.90  Such
protesting would be intended to intercept the Jews for Jesus
audience, but this type of activity would presumably be protected
by the First Amendment right to free speech.9' In continuing its
commercial use analysis, the court stated:
The conduct of [Brodsky] also constitutes a
commercial use of the Mark and the Name of
the [Jews for Jesus] [o]rganization because it is
designed to [commercially] harm the
[o]rganization . . . by disparaging it and [by]
preventing the . . . [o]rganization from
exploiting [its own] Mark . . . . In addition,
[Brodsky's] Internet site has and will continue
Organization will prevail on the merits at final hearing;
(2) the extent to which the Plaintiff Organization is
being irreparably harmed by the conduct complained
of; (3) the extent to which the Defendant will suffer
irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is issued;
and (4) the public interest.
Id. at 292.
87. Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998).
88. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. at 308.
89. Id. at 290-91 (stating that Brodsky created his website to criticize
Jews for Jesus).
90. See generally Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 778 (6th Cir.
2003) (holding that the defendant-appellant was not only permitted to operate
the website, "taubmansucks.com," but that he was also free to shout
"Taubman Sucks!" from the rooftops).
91. See generally id.
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to inhibit the efforts of Internet users to locate
the [Jews for Jesus] Internet site.9
It is unclear that Brodsky's website, "jewforjesus.com,"
would inhibit Internet users from locating the official Jews for Jesus
website, "jews-for-jesus.org."9'3 An Internet user would probably
search for the official website using two different methods: by
guessing the domain name or by running an online search for the
website using a search engine.94 First, if an individual tried to guess
the domain name for the organization's official site and was
directed to Brodsky's site, that individual would likely realize that
Brodsky's site is not the official Jews for Jesus site. Thus, the
individual would be free to continue searching. 95 Additionally,
assume Brodsky did not register the domain name, and his website
did not exist. If an individual in search of the official Jews for Jesus
site happened to be directed to the website "jewsforjesus.org," the
individual would arrive at a nonexistent website and would be free
to continue searching. 96 In both cases, the result would be the
92. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. at 308.
93. Id. at 290.
94. See generally Press Release, iProspect, iProspect Survey Finds Search
Engines Beat all Other Media for Driving Visitors to Web Sites with 77% of
Internet Users Employing Search Engines to Find Web Sites (Sept. 16, 2002),
available at http://www.iprospect.com/media/press2002-09-16.htm. The study
found that 77% of Internet users use search engines to locate specific websites,
more frequently than any other method. Id. Other less frequently used
methods include banner advertisements and website links included in spam e-
mail messages. Id.
This Note assumes that an individual, searching for a particular website
without the aid of an online search engine, would not rely on finding the
website by waiting to encounter a banner advertisement or to receive a spam
e-mail. These methods are unreliable and inefficient. Instead, the individual
would most likely try to locate the website by simply guessing its domain name
and typing it directly into a web browser.
95. Assume that Brodsky would be willing to include a link to the official
Jews for Jesus site, in his website. If an individual seeking the official site were
directed to Brodsky's site instead, that individual would only have to click on
that link to arrive at the official site. If this were the case, it might even be
easier for Internet users to find the official site than it would be if Brodsky's
site did not exist at all.
96. For example, in Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 777 (6th Cir.
2003), the court noted that the existence of the defendant-appellant's website
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same: the individual would be free to continue searching. Thus, the
existence of Brodsky's site may not affect an individual's online
search for the official Jews for Jesus website, a conclusion that
would undermine the court's ruling.
Second, if an individual conducted an online search to
locate the official Jews for Jesus website, the search results would
most likely contain the official site and Brodsky's critical
commentary site.7  The website descriptions would allow the
individual to distinguish between the official site and Brodsky's
site.98 Thus, Brodsky's site would not inhibit the individual from
ultimately locating the intended official website. Instead, his site
would only serve as an alternative option.
Now assume that Brodsky's website did in fact inhibit
Internet users from finding the official Jews for Jesus website. That
factor alone does not constitute a Lanham Act violation. In
analyzing trademark infringement claims under the Lanham Act, a
court must first determine if the use of an owner's trademark is
commercial.9 If the court determines the use is noncommercial, the
may actually help Internet users find the trademark owner's website. The
court stated:
[T]he customers who stumble upon [the defendant-
appellant's] site would otherwise have reached a dead
address. They would have received an error message
upon typing [the defendant-appellant's domain name],
simply stating that the name was not a proper domain
name, with no message relating how to arrive at the
official site. Hence, [defendant-appellant's] website
and its disclaimer actually serve to re-direct lost
customers to [the trademark owner's] site that might
otherwise be lost.
Id.
97. This hypothesis may not be tested because Brodsky's website no
longer exists due to court order. In fact, Brodsky's domain name
"jewsforjesus.org" now belongs to Jews for Jesus who uses it in addition to its
original domain name "jews-for-jesus.org." See Jews for Jesus Home Pages,
http://www.jews-for-jesus.org and http://www.jewsforjesus.org.
98. This hypothesis may not be tested because Brodsky's website no
longer exists.
99. See Taubman, 319 F.3d at 774 (stating that the Lanham Act "only
regulates commercial speech").
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analysis ends, there is no Lanham Act violation, and the
defendant's speech is protected.'0° However, if the court concludes
that the use is commercial, then the court must determine whether
or not that use is also misleading.' °'
In Brodsky, the court first determined that Brodsky's
website was misleading and therefore commercial.'02 However,
"commercial use" and "likelihood of confusion" are separate and
independent elements of a trademark infringement claim under the
Lanham Act. ")3 Speech that is only misleading does not constitute a
violation.' °4 Therefore, the misleading nature of Brodsky's website
should not have factored into the court's commercial use analysis.
Brodsky did not use his website for profit or for any
commercial transactions, '05 but his site did contain a single
seemingly commercial element: a link to the Outreach Judaism
website. '' Outreach Judaism, a non-profit organization, solicits
funds by selling merchandise. ' o However, the court held that only
Brodsky's domain name, and not "[t]he content of . . . [his
website]," including the link to Outreach Judaism, was at issue.
Thus, the dispute did "not implicate rights granted by the First
Amendment."'0 Under this approach, the court's commercial use
analysis focused on the domain name itself, and the website's
content and intended or actual purpose were irrelevant.
The Brodsky court's commercial use analysis assumes that
domain names will never contain speech content; however, domain
names may contain sentences and other speech content. For
example, if Brodsky's site had been "JewsForJesuslsCorrupt.com,"
then the domain name would contain speech content, and a
100. See id. ("If [the] use is commercial, then, and only then, do[es] [a
court] analyze [the] use for a likelihood of confusion.").
101. See id. at 774-75.
102. Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 307-08 (D.N.J. 1998).
103. Id.
104. See Taubman, 319 F.3d at 775.
105. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. at 308.
106. Id.
107. Id.
10& Id. at 286-87 n.1.
109. Id.
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trademark infringement claim against Brodsky would implicate
First Amendment rights."° For this reason, courts should not solely
focus on the website's domain name. Instead, courts should
determine the website's purpose and whether it is used for
commercial transactions or merely for noncommercial criticism or
commentary. If a court applied this analysis, Brodsky's website
would not have constituted a commercial use and would not be
subject to the Lanham Act.
2. PETA v. Doughney
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals conducted a similar
commercial use analysis in PETA v. Doughney.1' PETA, an animal
rights organization "dedicated to promoting and heightening public
awareness of animal protection issues," 2 strongly "opposes the
exploitation of animals for food, clothing, entertainment and
vivisection."".3 Doughney, familiar with PETA's views, registered
the domain name "peta.org" and created a parody website he
entitled "People Eating Tasty Animals."' 14 The website's stated
purpose was to be a "resource for those who enjoy eating meat,
wearing fur and leather, hunting, and the fruits of scientific
research.""' 5 The site also "contained links to various meat, fur,
leather, hunting, animal research, and other organizations," all of
which expressed ideas antithetical to PETA's mission. 116
PETA filed suit against Doughney for trademark
infringement under the Lanham Act and for cybersquatting under
the ACPA 7  Doughney argued that his website "was a
110. See generally Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 778 (6th Cir.
2003) (noting that the defendant-appellant has a First Amendment right to
name a website "taubmansucks.com").
111. 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001).
112 Id. at 362 (quoting Brief for Appellee-Cross-Appellant at 7, PETA
v. Doughney, No. 00-2289 (4th Cir. Nov. 22, 2000).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 362-63.
115. Id. at 363 (quoting the defendant-appellant's website "peta.org"
which does not currently exist).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 362.
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constitutionally-protected parody of PETA""1 and that he had a
First Amendment right to express himself through parody." 9 In
addressing the Lanham Act's commercial use requirement,
Doughney further disputed the claim "that he used the Mark in
connection with goods or services."2 The Fourth Circuit disagreed,
holding that his website was in fact "in connection with goods or
services."' I" The court stated:
To use PETA's Mark "in connection with"
goods or services, Doughney need not have
actually sold or advertised goods or services on
[his] website. Rather, Doughney need only
have prevented [Internet] users from obtaining
or using PETA's goods or services .... While
sparse, existing caselaw on infringement and
unfair competition in the Internet context
clearly weighs in favor of this conclusion.122
However, if a website does not sell or advertise goods or
services, and a court holds the website to be commercial and "in
connection with goods or services," then the court broadens the
scope of federal trademark protection at the expense of First• - 123
Amendment free speech rights. In deciding whether Doughney's
website was commercial, the court did not limit its analysis to his
website, but it also considered PETA's website.124 The court noted
118. Id. at 363.
119. Id. at 369. Doughney believed "he was within his First Amendment
rights to create a parody of the [PETA] organization." Id.
120. Id. at 365.
121. Id. at 366.
122. Id. at 365. The court rejected Doughney's parody defense because a
parody requires the conveyance of "two simultaneous - and contradictory -
messages: that it is the original, but also that it is not the original and is instead
a parody." Id. at 366 (quoting Cliff Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell
Publ'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989)). The court held that
Doughney's domain name did not convey the two messages simultaneously
because users must open the web page to view the second message. Id.
123. See supra Introduction.
124. PETA, 263 F.3d at 365 (stating Doughney's site only had to prevent
Internet users from obtaining PETA's goods or services offered on the
organization's official website).
363
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that PETA's site offers goods and services, and Doughney's website
could hinder Internet users from finding the official site and
accessing the PETA's goods and services.1 25  Thus, Doughney's
website was "in connection with good or services" because it
indirectly affected PETA's distribution of goods and services.1
26
Interestingly, the PETA court could have found commercial
use on another ground. Doughney's website contained "links to
more than 30 commercial operations offering goods and services,'
2
1
and courts have held this type of conduct to be sufficiently
commercial under the Lanham Act.'28 However, instead of finding
commercial use based on that evidence, the court broadened the
definition of commercial speech, stating that a website does not
have to sell or advertise goods and services to be considered
commercial. 1
29
Recently, the Ninth Circuit criticized the Fourth Circuit's
broad interpretation of what constitutes commercial speech under
the Act's commercial use requirement. The Ninth Circuit stated:
The PETA court's reading of the Lanham Act
would encompass almost all uses of a registered
trademark, even when the mark is merely being
used to identify the object of consumer
criticism. This broad view of the Lanham Act
is supported by neither the text of the statute
nor the history of trademark laws in this
country.30
The courts' broad interpretation of commercial speech in
Brodsky and PETA stretched trademark protection beyond its
intended purpose of protecting consumers from purchasing an
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 366.
128. See, e.g., Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 775 (6th Cir. 2003)
(holding that since the defendant-appellant's websites did not contain any
commercial links, then the Lanham Act could not be properly invoked
because there was no commercial use).
129. PETA, 263 F.3d at 365.
130. Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)
(footnote omitted).
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infringer's products "under the mistaken assumption that they are
buying a product produced or sponsored by [the trademark
owner]."'' Such expansive interpretations of commercial speech
severely infringe upon First Amendment free speech rights.
B. A Narrower Interpretation of Commercial Speech
1. Taubman Co. v. Webfeats
In Taubman Co. v. Webfeas,32 the defendant-appellant Henry
Mishkoff registered "shopsatwillowbend.com," a website devoted
to "The Shops at Willowbend," Taubman's new shopping mall
development and newly registered trademark.'33 The website
provided unofficial information about the shopping development
including maps and tenant information.'3 Upon discovering
Mishkoff's site, Taubman filed a trademark infringement claim
under the Lanham Act and demanded that Mishkoff remove the
website. 35 In retaliation, Mishkoff created several cybergriping
sites including, "willowbendmallsucks.com," "taubmansucks.com,"
and "shopsatwillowbendsucks.com."13
6
Mishkoff claimed that his use of Taubman's trademark was
noncommercial ' 37 and that any injunction order would be a "prior
restraint on his First Amendment right to speak."'' 38 The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted
Taubman two preliminary injunctions which collectively prevented
131. Id. (quoting Beneficial Corp. v. Beneficial Capital Corp., 529 F.
Supp. 445,450 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
132. 319 F.3d 770 (6th Cir. 2003).
133. Id. at 772.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. Mishkoff also registered "willowbendsucks.com" and
"theshopsatwillowbendsucks.com." Id.
137. Id. at 775.
138. Id. at 773.
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Mishkoff from using any of his registered domain names.39
Mishkoff appealed the decision."O
In its analysis, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that
"[t]he Lanham Act is constitutional because it only regulates
commercial speech, which is entitled to reduced protections under
the First Amendment. 1 41 Recognizing the connection between the
Lanham Act's commercial use requirement and the First
Amendment, the court stated "we need not analyze Mishkoff's
constitutional defenses independent of our Lanham Act analysis.,
14 2
The court further recognized that for Mishkoff's use to be
considered trademark infringement, it must be considered
misleading commercial speech. 43 The court held that the domain
name "shopsatwillowbend.com" was not commercial speech
because the site did not contain any commercial links. '44 The court
noted that "[a]s long as Mishkoff has no commercial links on either
of his websites . . . we find no use 'in connection with the
advertising' of goods and services to enjoin, and the Lanham Act
cannot be properly invoked.'
45
As for Mishkoff's cybergriping websites, the court
sidestepped the commercial speech issue'46 and stated that even if
Mishkoff's use is commercial, it must still lead to a likelihood of
confusion as to the source to constitute a Lanham Act violation,
139. Id. at 771.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 774.
142. Id. at 775.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. Mishkoff's website initially contained links to two commercial
websites. Id. The court found that the inclusion of these links, "though
extremely minimal, constituted [Mishkoff's] use of Taubman's [trademark] 'in
connection with the advertising' of the goods sold by the advertisers [using
those commercial websites] ... precisely what the Lanham Act prohibits." Id.
However, Mishkoff had already removed these links; thus, his website was no
longer commercial and therefore, not subject to the Lanham Act. Id.
146. The court never performed a "commercial use" analysis but instead
only performed a "likelihood of confusion" analysis and found that there was
no likelihood of confusion because there was "no likelihood that a customer
would be confused as to the source of Taubman's and Mishkoff's respective
goods." Id. at 777.
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and the qualifying moniker "sucks" removes any likelihood of
confusion. 14 The court further explained that Mishkoff used his
sites only as an outlet to express himself, and although Mishkoff
might have intended to cause Tauban economic damage, when
there is no confusion as to the source, the First Amendment
protects critical commentary, even criticism of a business.1'4 The
court noted that the "rooftops of our past have evolved into the
Internet domain names of our present."'' 49 Thus, just as Mishkoff is
free to express himself by shouting "Taubman Sucks!" from the
rooftops, he is also free to express himself in a domain name.15
C. The Taubman Decision Compared to the Brodsky and PETA
Decisions
Two important distinctions exist between Taubman and the
Brodsky and PETA decisions. First, the Taubman court's analysis
reflected a proper balance between the Lanham Act and the First
Amendment. While the Brodsky court plainly stated that the
"dispute does not implicate rights granted by the First
Amendment,""'5 the Taubman court recognized "the interrelation
between the First Amendment and the Lanham Act," and that its
interpretation of the Lanham Act would directly affect the
infringing party's First Amendment free speech rights. 
1 52
Second, in Taubman's commercial use analysis, the court
did not consider the effect the infringing website had on the
trademark owner. However, in its likelihood of confusion analysis,
the court did consider the effect the infringing website had on the
trademark owner's site, but the court stated that because the
infringing website contained a disclaimer, the site may "actually
serve to re-direct lost customers to [the trademark owner's] site that




151. Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 286-87 n.1 (D.N.J.
1998).
152. Taubman, 319 F.3d at 774-75.
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might otherwise be lost.', 5 3 On the other hand, the PETA court
stated that to "use [the trademark owner's] mark 'in connection
with' goods or services ... [the infringing website] need only have
prevented users from obtaining or using [the trademark owner's]
goods or services. ' 54
III. RECENT LANHAM ACr JURISPRUDENCE
A. Bosley Medical Institute, Inc. v. Kremer
In Bosley Medical Institute, Inc. v. Kremer,"5 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals narrowly interpreted commercial speech
under the Lanham Act's commercial use requirement'5 6 and
criticized the Fourth Circuit's broad interpretation in PETA.57
Kremer, a former patient dissatisfied with a hair transplant
performed by a Bosley physician, sued Bosley Medical for medical
malpractice, but the lawsuit was dismissed. 1 8  Then, Kremer
registered "BosleyMedical.com" and created a website devoted to
criticizing the Bosley Medical Institute.159  Notably, "Kremer
earn[ed] no revenue from the website and no goods or services
[were] sold on the website."' 6  However, "BosleyMedical.com"
contained a link to another website, also owned by Kremer, which
in turn, contained a link to a newsgroup website. 16' The newsgroup
website contained several advertisements for Bosley competitors.1
62
In addition, "BosleyMedical.com" contained a link to the website
153. Id. at 777.
154. PETA v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2001).
155. 403 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2005).
156. Id. at 679.
157. Id.





2006] LANHAM ACT'S COMMERCIAL USE
for the public interest group that represented Kremer in this case.113
In response, Bosley Medical filed a Lanham Act trademark
infringement claim against Kremer for unauthorized use of the
registered trademark "Bosley Medical." '64
In addressing the trademark infringement claim, the Ninth
Circuit first noted that the purpose of the Lanham Act is "to
protect consumers who have formed particular associations with a
mark from buying a competing product using the same or
substantially similar mark and to allow the mark holder to
distinguish his product from that of his rivals.' ' 15 Even though the
First Amendment "offer[s] little protection for a competitor who
labels its commercial good with a confusingly similar mark .. .
trademark rights do not entitle the owner to quash an unauthorized
use of the mark by another who is communicating ideas or
expressing points of view."' 6 Rather, the purpose of trademark law
is to protect "consumers from purchasing the products of an
infringer 'under the mistaken assumption that they are buying a
product produced or sponsored by [the trademark owner]." 67
The court then addressed the commercial use
requirement.8 Bosley claimed that "Kremer used the mark 'in
connection with goods and services' because he prevented users
from obtaining [Bosley's] goods and services.' 69 Bosley's argument
was similar to the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of commercial
speech in PETA. '7° However, the Ninth Circuit strongly disagreed
163. Id.
164. Id. In addition, Bosley filed claims for "dilution, unfair competition,
various state law claims, and a libel claim that was eventually settled." Id.
165. Id. at 676.
166. Id. at 677 (quoting Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 269 F. 3d 894,
900 (9th Cir. 2002)).
167. Id. at 679 (quoting Beneficial Corp. v. Beneficial Capital Corp., 529
F. Supp. 445,450 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
16& Id. at 677.
169. Id. at 678.
170. PETA v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that
"[tjo use [the trademark owner's] Mark 'in connection with' goods or services,
[the infringing website] need .. .only have prevented [Internet] users from
obtaining or using [the trademark owner's] goods or services").
369
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with Bosley's argument and criticized the Fourth Circuit's broad
interpretation of commercial speech. The Ninth Circuit stated:
To the extent that the PETA court held that
the Lanham Act's commercial use requirement
is satisfied because the defendant's use of the
[trademark owner's] mark as the domain name
may deter customers from reaching the
[trademark owner's] site itself, we respectfully
disagree with that rationale. While it is true
that www.BosleyMedical.com is not sponsored
by Bosley Medical, it is just as true that it is
about Bosley Medical. The PETA approach
would place most critical, otherwise protected
consumer commentary under the restrictions of
the Lanham Act.7 '
Unlike the Fourth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit focused its
commercial use analysis on whether Kremer's website offered
goods and services in competition with Bosley. i12 The court found
that Kremer, not a competitor of Bosley, was only a critic.
7
1
Furthermore, "no customer [would] mistakenly purchase a hair
replacement service from Kremer under the belief that the service
[was] being offered by Bosley.' ' 4  The court also recognized
Bosley's attempt to use the Lanham Act as a means of squelching
critical commentary.'75 The court noted that any harm to Bosley
was caused by Kremer's criticism, not by "a competitor's sale of a
similar product under Bosley's mark." 176 Thus, the court concluded
that Bosley could not "use the Lanham Act ... as a shield from
Kremer's criticism... or as a sword to [silence him].
17 7
The court also noted that the United States Supreme Court
has held that "trademark infringement law prevents only
171. Kremer, 403 F.3d at 679.
172. Id. (stating that "the appropriate inquiry is whether Kremer offers
competing services to the public").
173. Id.
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unauthorized uses of a trademark in connection with a commercial
transaction in which the trademark is being used to confuse
potential consumers., 17 8 The Ninth Circuit also noted that limiting
the Lanham Act to cases where an infringing party is trying to
profit from a trademark owner's mark is consistent with the
Supreme Court's view that a trademark's function is "simply to
designate the goods as the product of a particular trader and to
protect his [goodwill] against the sale of another's product as his.,
179
The Ninth Circuit's commercial use analysis in Kremer
appropriately emphasized the importance of limiting the scope of
federal trademark law in order for it to serve its intended purpose
of protecting a trademark owner from imitating competitors who
attempt to profit from the owner's goodwill. If commercial use
were interpreted more broadly, the Lanham Act could limit
noncommercial speech, such as critical commentary or parody,
which is protected by the First Amendment. Therefore, the Ninth
Circuit's analysis offers appropriate consideration of the proper
function of trademark law and its relationship with the First
Amendment.
B. Lamparello v. Falwell
In Lamparello v. Falwell,'.. the Fourth Circuit failed to
resolve what constitutes commercial speech under the Lanham Act.
In this case, the well-known evangelist Reverend Jerry Falwell
owned and operated "falwell.com," a website devoted to spreading
his conservative Christian views.8 Reverend Falwell also owns the
trademarks "Jerry Falwell" and "Falwell."'8 2 After hearing a radio
interview in which Falwell expressed anti-homosexual views,
Lamparello created a website at "fallwell.com," to respond to
17& Id. at 676 (emphasis added).
179. Id. at 679 (quoting United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248
U.S. 90, 97 (1918)).
180. 420 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2005).
181. Id. at 311.
182. Id.
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Falwell's arguments and address "untruths about gay people."'
3
The domain name was an intentional misspelling of Jerry Falwell's
official website, "falwell.com." ' 8" When Falwell discovered
Lamparello's site, he demanded that Lamparello stop using the site
or any other variation of his name. Lamparello sought a
declaratory judgment of non-infringement, and Falwell counter-
claimed alleging both Lanham Act and ACPA wolatons.'
In addressing the Lanham Act trademark infringement
claim, Lamparello defended his website on commercial use grounds
and emphasized that the "application of the Lanham Act must be
restricted to 'commercial speech' to assure that trademark law does
not become a tool for unconstitutional censorship."' The Fourth
Circuit recognized that this view had been endorsed by the Sixth
Circuit in Taubman and more recently by the Ninth Circuit in
Kremer.'8 In contrast to these decisions, the Fourth Circuit chose
not to resolve "the difficult question of what constitutes ...
[commercial] speech under" the Lanham Act.'89 In addition, the
183. Id. The website also "included headlines such as 'Bible verses that
Dr. Falwell chooses to ignore' and 'Jerry Falwell has been bearing false
witness (Exodus 20:16) against his gay and lesbian neighbors for a long time."'
Id. Additionally, Lamparello included strong criticism aimed directly at Jerry
Falwell and his allegedly "anti-gay political agenda.., at the expense of the
gospel." Id.
184. Though the website was an intentional misspelling, it did contain a
disclaimer stating: "This website is NOT affiliated with Jerry Falwell or his
ministry" and provided a link to the official Jerry Falwell website. Id.
Disclaimers can weigh in a defendant's favor. See Taubman Co. v. Webfeats,
319 F.3d 770, 776 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that the existence of a disclaimer is
very informative in the likelihood of confusion analysis).
185. Lamparello, 420 F.3d at 311.
186. Id. at 312.
187. Id. at 313.
188. Id. Both the Sixth and Ninth Circuits endorsed the view that the
Lanham Act should only limit commercial speech because if interpreted more
broadly, the Act could infringe on First Amendment free speech rights. See
Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 674 (9th Cir. 2005); Taubman,
319 F.3d at 774.
189. Lamparello, 420 F.3d at 314.
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court even doubted whether the Lanham Act applies exclusively to
commercial speech. '9
The court ultimately sided with Lamparello because there
was no likelihood of confusion between Lamparello's and Falwell's
websites. Within its likelihood of confusion analysis, the court
offered some support to Lamparello's commercial speech
argument, noting that "Falwell does not even argue that
Lamparello's website constitutes advertising or a facility for
business, let alone a facility or advertising similar to that of
Reverend Falwell. Furthermore, Lamparello created his website
... [as a critical] forum... [and] not to steal customers.
''92
In addition, the court cited the Ninth Circuit's Kremer
decision which held that an alleged infringer "is not liable for using
another's mark in its domain name if [the infringer] 'could not
financially capitalize on . . . misdirected consumer[s]." ' 3  The
Fourth Circuit acknowledged that when adopting the most recent
amendments to the Lanham Act, including the FTDA and the
ACPA, "Congress left little doubt that it did not intend for
trademark laws to impinge the First Amendment rights of critics
and commentators."'' 94
However, in stark contrast to Kremer, the Lamparello court
sidestepped the commercial use issue and completely failed to
address what constitutes commercial speech under the Lanham
Act.9 5 By avoiding the issue, the Fourth Circuit deviated from the
Ninth Circuit's sensible analysis in Kremer, thereby confusing the
current state of Lanham Act jurisprudence.
190. Id. (stating that "we need not ... determine whether [the Lanham
Act and the FT7DA] apply exclusively to commercial speech").
191. Id.
192. Id. at 315.
193. Id. at 317.
194. Id. at 313 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995)).
195. Compare Lamparello, 420 F.3d at 314 (choosing not to resolve the
"question of what constitutes [commercial] speech" under the Lanham Act
and determining under the likelihood of confusion requirement that there was
no violation of the Act) with Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672,
679-80 (9th Cir. 2005) (focusing the commercial use analysis on whether the
defendant-appellee's website offered goods and services in competition with
the plaintiff-appellant).
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A CLEARER JURISPRUDENCE:
AN ALTERNATIVE TEST PROPOSED
In Kremer, the Ninth Circuit narrowly interpreted
commercial speech in favor of greater online free speech rights, but
the decision lacked a specific commercial use test.' 6  In
Lamparello,'97 the Fourth Circuit did not even attempt to resolve
the commercial use issue. '98 Thus, the Fourth Circuit left unaffected
its opinion in PETA that commercial use does not require the
actual selling or advertising of goods or services. 19 These decisions
illustrate the inconsistent manner in which federal courts analyze
the Lanham Act's commercial use requirement in online trademark
infringement cases.
In order to provide consistency and predictability in this
area of law, the United States Supreme Court or the Fourth Circuit
should adopt a uniform commercial use test. To properly protect
First Amendment free speech rights, the proposed test would
narrowly interpret commercial speech. Under the proposed test,
trademark protection of Internet domain names would be limited
to a set of specific circumstances. When the alleged infringing
party's website is directly involved in commercial transactions -
such as advertising or selling goods or services in an attempt to
profit from the trademark owner's goodwill - then the party is
engaging in commercial speech subject to Lanham Act regulation.
If the party's website is not directly involved in commercial
transactions or does not attempt to profit from the trademark
owner's goodwill, then the commercial use requirement is not met
and the online speech is protected. Courts should not consider
whether or not the website has any effect on the trademark owner
as this is a separate inquiry from the determination of commercial
use. Furthermore, courts should not consider whether a likelihood
of confusion exists between the alleged infringer's website and the
196. See discussion supra Part III.A.
197. 420 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2005).
198. Id. at 314.
199. 263 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2001) ("To use PETA's Mark 'in
connection with' goods or services, Doughney need not have actually sold or
advertised goods or services on the www.peta.org website.").
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trademark owner's website because "likelihood of confusion" is a
separate and independent element of trademark infringement.
If a court were to apply the proposed commercial use test to
the facts in Brodskyx or in PETA,20 ' a court could reasonably
conclude that both the critical commentary in Brodsky 2 and the
parody in PETA203 would not constitute commercial use. Neither
Brodsky nor Doughney were directly involved in commercial
transactions, and they were not attempting to profit from the
trademark owner's goodwill. Thus, there would be no Lanham Act
violation.
A commercial use analysis that limits commercial use to
commercial transactions attempting to profit from the trademark
owner's goodwill protects trademark owners from infringing
competitors and prevents trademark law from silencing
noncommercial critical commentary and parody. As a result, the
proposed test's narrower interpretation of commercial speech,
similar to the Ninth Circuit's interpretation in Kremer, protects
trademark owners from the unauthorized commercial use of their
marks. At the same time, the test protects First Amendment free
speech rights and the robust "marketplace of ideas. ',204 Thus, the
test attains the proper balance between online trademark
protection and First Amendment free speech rights.
CONCLUSION
Currently, there is a lack of uniformity in the federal circuits
regarding the Lanham Act's commercial use test, and, as a result,
200. See Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998); see
also discussion supra Part II.A.1.
201. See PETA v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001); see also
discussion supra Part II.A.2.
202. See Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. at 290-91.
203. See PETA, 263 F.3d at 362-63.
204. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting
United States v. Assoc. Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). See
generally Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961
Sup. CT. REV. 245, 257 (1961) ("Public discussions of public issues, together
with the spreading of information and opinion bearing on those issues, must
have a freedom unabridged by our agents.").
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the commercial use test differs in the Ninth, Sixth, and Fourth
Circuits. These inconsistencies will continue unless the United
States Supreme Court adopts a uniform commercial use test. The
test should narrowly interpret commercial use in order to prevent
trademark law from expanding beyond its intended scope and
infringing online free speech rights. One way to narrowly interpret
commercial use is to require an infringing website to be directly
involved in commercial transactions in an attempt to profit off the
trademark owner's goodwill. This requirement will prevent
unauthorized use of another's mark in an attempt to profit, but will
permit the use of another's trademark for the purpose of
noncommercial commentary and parody. By strictly limiting online
trademark infringement to commercial speech in this context, the
proper balance between federal trademark law and First
Amendment free speech protections may be achieved, and the
current inconsistency in the Fourth Circuit resolved.
